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I. INTRODUCTION
Currently a considerable amount of attention is being focused on prop-
erty and casualty insurance,' particularly the mass market personal lines,
which include private passenger automobile, homeowners, multiple line,'
and fire coverage. In fact, the insurance enterprise has become a matter
of national attention, with changes to the system of property and casualty
insurance being proposed and investigated by virtually every group af-
fected.' One area of widespread concern is regulation of property and
casualty insurance rates4-an area controlled almost exclusively by the
states' pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act.6
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Faculty of Law, Columbia University. Part of the research for this article was facilitated by a
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1 3Based on annual premiums paid, the most significant lines of "property and casualty" in-
surance include automobile liability, physical damage, and injury; fire, extended coverage, and
allied lines (including coverage for damage caused by lightning, smoke, water, windstorms, hail,
explosions, sprinkler leakage, and earthquakes); multiple peril (including package policies cov-
ering numerous lines for homeowners and businesses); inland marine transport insurance; and
miscellaneous lines such as products liability and medical malpractice. See Rose, State Regula-
tion of Property and Casulty Insurance Rates, 28 OHIo ST. LJ. 669-70 (1967). Other phrases
used to describe this class of insurance include "property and liability insurance," "fire, marine,
and casualty insurance," "non-life insurance," and "fire and casualty insurance." See I BULLETIN
OF Co iussloN ON INSURANCE TERMINOLOGY Or AMRmucAN RIsK & INsURANcE Associ-
ATION 5-6 (March 1965).
2 
"Multiple line" refers to coverage which includes protection against loss of property be-
longing to the insured as well as protection against financial loss resulting from liability of the
insured to someone else. 2 BULLETIN OF COMMISSION ON INSURANcE TERMINOLOGY OF
AMERIcAN RISK & INSURANcE ASSOCIATION 4 (July 1966).
3 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 815, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 76-95 (1967). As one executive of a
major insurance company has remarked: "[IThe consumer is not satisfied with what he gets
for his insurance dollar compared with what he gets for his other dollars." Gibson, Our Eco-
nomic Imperative: Increasing the Marginal Utility Per Dollar of Private Insurance, BEST'S
RUMEW, June 1969, at 16 (property-liability ed.).
4 Technically, "rate" refers to price per unit of exposure, while "premium" refers to the total
charge for coverage. For example, in fire insurance the unit of exposure is stated in terms of
$100 of insured value for one year. If the rate is 50 cents per $100 of insured value, the annual
premium for a $10,000 structure would be $50. However, the terms "rate" and "premium" are
commonly used interchangeably or together.
5 For a discussion of the foundations of state regulation, see Rose, supra note 1, at 670-73,
679-86, 693-95.
6 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964). Section 1012 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, in
part
(a) The business of insurance ... shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance... ;
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Over two decades have elapsed since the State of Ohio enacted its rate
regulatory laws. When enacted, these laws were recognized as an exper-
iment, subject to change as experience dictated.7  It would therefore seem
incumbent upon the state to review periodically its laws and practices for
regulating property and casualty insurance and to implement changes if ap-
propriate.' This article traces the development of and analyzes the exist-
ing regulatory pattern in Ohio, considers the aims of rate regulation, indi-
cates why and in what ways the system is not working well, and analyzes
proposals for change.
II. HISTORY OF OHIO REGULATION
The present system of property and casualty insurance rate regulation in
Ohio reflects the historical development of industry practices and regula-
tory responses. Today, as in the past century, statutory and administrative
regulation reflect little more than stopgap measures aimed only at solving
particular problems.
Until the late 1800's property and casualty insurance rates were unreg-
Provided, That after June 30, 1948 .... the Sherman Act,... the Clayton Act, and ...
the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
Recently, some observers have endorsed the idea of amending the McCarran Act to restrict
state control of rates. See, e.g., McHugh, More Federal Relation and/or More Competition,
in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, ANID SOCIAL POLICY 193 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds.
1969). Nevertheless, federal regulation,of rates does not appear imminent, and this analysis
is based on the assumption that state jurisdiction of property and casualty rates will continue
under the McCarran Act. The states have exercised almost exclusive control of this area for
more than one hundred years. If for no other reasons, tradition and inertia preclude the fed-
eral government's usurpation of jurisdiction. Kimball, The Case for State Regulation of In-
surance, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 411, 421 (S. Kimball & H.
Denenberg eds. 1969). Furthermore, few insurers support federal regulation and cer-
tainly the states oppose the idea. Federal regulation of insurance has been debated for years,
both in and out of Congress. See Rose, supra note 1, at 673. But there is little evidence that
the federal government will enter the area of rate regulation of property and casualty insurance.
Within the last decade state rate regulation has withstood severe criticism without federal inter-
vention. S. REP. No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 111-29 (1961); S. REP. No. 1834, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 239-47 (1960). A corollary to federal regulation is the idea of the states abandoning
rate regulation. Almost no one who has considered this alternative supports it. See WEST'S
WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE SERVICE, Preliminary Comment to Chapter 625, at 371-72 (1969);
Williams, Price Discrimination in Property and Liability Insurance, in INSuRANCE, GOVERN-
MENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 209, 241 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969); Strain, Insur-
ance Pricing and Its Role in Relation to Economic Theory and Marketing Management, 33 J.
RISK & INS. 447, 452 (1966).
7 1946 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 377. It
has been said that "Regulation ... is a living thing. It cannot be locked off into any permanent
formula. It must change as the economic system in which it operates changes. The good, sound,
practical regulation of one decade may not be necessarily the good, sound, practical regulation
of another...." Welch, The Effectiveness of Commission Regulation of Public Utility Enter-
prise, 49 GEo. L.J. 639, 672 (1961).
8 In 1969 several states enacted legislation to change existing modes of rate regulation.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-201a-m (West Supp. 1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73,
§§ 1065.18-1 to -34 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); Mni. STAT. ANN. §§ 70A.01-.22 (West.
Supp. 1970); N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 175-80 (McKinney Supp. 1970); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 987.205-
.340 (1969); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 625.01-.35 (West Supp. 1969).
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ulated. After the Chicago and Boston fires of 1871 and 1872, insurers
set out to establish and maintain a system of uniform pricing to eliminate
extensive rate fluctuations. Although a national scheme of concerted rate-
making broke down by the 1880's, regional activities flourished.9 In 1885,
in response to intense antitrust sentiment,"0 legislation was enacted in Ohio
prohibiting combinations to control fire insurance rates." Acting under
the belief that competition alone would keep rates as low as possible, the
Ohio legislature endorsed competition in fire insurance ratemaking, both
for companies and their agents.'"
While Ohio was seeking to preclude rate-making combinations and to
promote competition in fire insurance, it became apparent that legislative
proscriptions were not being heeded. In a series of quo warranto actions
during the 1890's," testimony revealed that "advisory rates" were being
promulgated, by which individual agents engaged in rate-fixing conspir-
acies.14 Consequently, in the early 1900's a legislative committee was ap-
9 See S. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 94-97 (1960). While pricing agree-
ments were developing in the insurance industry a parallel phenomenon was occurring in the in-
dustrial sector of the economy. See H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 72-76,
308 (1955).
'0 The development of public concern about cooperative actions of competitors and govern-
mental opposition to such actions is traced in H. THORELLI, supra note 9, at 54-164.
182 OHIo LAws 231 (1885) as amended OI-Ho REV. CODE ANN. § 3927.05 (Page 1953)
[hereinafter cited as CODE]. Ohio was the first state to enact an anticompact law. The statute
applied only to rates charged for fire insurance by companies organized outside Ohio; domestic
companies could combine to fix rates. Therefore, the anticompact legislation merely reflected a
limited reaction against combinations to fix rates; localism prevailed to exempt domestic com-
panies. The effort to prefer or give advantage to domestic companies over foreign ones was
prevalent throughout the United States in the 1800's. The feeling was that foreign corporations
were intruders and should be substantially restricted. S. KIMBALL, supra note 9, at 96-97, 270-
88. Differential treatment between domestic and foreign companies continues today. See CODE
§§ 6725.18, 5729.03 (concerning tax rates), 3927.06 (requiring deposits of stock or bonds by
foreign companies).
2 In recognition of the need for industry cooperation in inspecting risks the anticompact
statute was amended in 1891. 88 Omo LAws 485-86 (1891). The amendment provided that
companies were not prohibited from employing a common agent or agents to supervise and
advise of defective structures, suggest improvements to lessen the fire hazard, and advise about
the relative value of risks. The amendment was significant in that it became the original
authority for establishing rating organizations or bureaus. C. YOUNGER, REPORT OF THE IN-
VESTIGATION OF FIRE INSURANCE RATES IN OHIO 89 (1930). In 1900 the statute was
amended again. 94 OHIO LAWS 103 (1900). This amendment prohibited combinations "for
the purpose of governing or controlling the rates per centum or amount of commission or com-
pensation to be allowed agents for procuring contracts for fire insurance on any property within
the state."
The anticompact statute [CODE § 3927.05] has never been repealed in Ohio although its
impact is virtually abrogated by CODE § 3935.17, which provides that compliance with sections
3935.01 to 3935.17 shall not constitute a violation of the anticompact statute.
13 See, e.g., State ex rel. Monnett v. Home Ins. Co., No. 5476, Record at 23 (Ohio Sup. Ct.
1897).
14 "Advisory rates" reflected a scheme to evade the anticompact laws. The scheme was car-
ried out through a "rater," who had no formal connection with any insurer, promulgating "ad-
visory rates" which were sold to insurers. N.Y. Merritt Comm., Report, Assembly Doc. No. 30,
134th Sess. (1911), reprinted in Insurance Industry Hearings before Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, pursuant to S. Res. 233, 86 Cong., 2nd
Sess., pt. 5, at 2791, 2800 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Insurance Industry Hearings]. In addi-
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pointed to investigate fire insurance rates. The inducement for the Ohio
study probably came from the recommendation of a joint committee of the
Senate and Assembly of New York, the Armstrong Committee, which con-
cluded that unrestricted competition invited rate wars which in turn re-
sulted in a dangerous lowering of the quality of protection afforded by
insurers. 15 Further impetus for the study probably came from a report of the
Committee on Fire Insurance Rates and Ratemaking to the National Con-
vention of Insurance Commissioners. This report recognized the failure
of "anti-compact laws" to bring about open competition. 6
From its study, the Ohio legislative committee concluded that insurers
were circumventing the Ohio law by various indirect means, including em-
ployment of a common agent to give "advice" concerning the relative
values of risks. The committee found that price-fixing schemes were car-
ried out through bureaus ostensibly formed to inspect insured structures. 17
These bureaus, which sold "advisory rates" to insurance companies, had
no competition for services in their respective territories. Although the
legislative committee admitted it could not find any evidence of express
agreement between companies to charge uniform rates, it did find that all
companies doing business in the state employed common agents or bureaus
which fixed uniform rates and imposed sanctions on members departing
from these rates.18
The reasons that insurers were not deterred by prohibitions against
tion, under this scheme companies' rates were checked to determine whether the advisory rates
were being followed. For an example of the checking process, see State ex rel. Crow v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1, 35-36, 52 S.W. 595, 604 (1899).
Three cases represent efforts to apply Ohio's general antitrust statute [the Valentine Act],
CODE §§ 1331.01-.99, to insurance pricing combinations. Foster v. Ankenbauer, 14 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 637 (C.P. 1913); State v. Boyee, 6 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 337 (C.P. 1907); State ex rel. Tay-
lor v. Ross, 4 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 377 (C.P. 1906). The issue of whether such combination vio-
lated the statute never reached the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the lower court decisions are
contradictory.
15 Report of N.Y. Merritt Comm., supra note 14. In 1911, in response to the Committee's
recommendations, legislation was enacted in New York permitting insurers of joint rate-making
organizations and to adhere to rates established by them. Rates were required to be filed with
the state superintendent of insurance who was empowered to supervise the activities of ratemaking
organizations. G. HARTMAN, RATEMAXING FOR HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 70 (1967).
16 1915 PROcEEDiNGs, NATIONAL CONVENTION OF INSURANcE COMMIssIONmES 20. The
Committee recommended legislation to regulate rate-making organizations and discriminatory
rates. In addition, laws were urged which would make membership in, or cooperation with,
rate bureaus compulsory. Id. at 19-21.
17 Report of Ohio Legislative Ins. Comm. to Hon. James M. Cox, Governor (1914). There
were three Ohio bureaus: The Cleveland Inspection Bureau, which fixed rates for Cuyahoga
County; the Cincinnati Fire Prevention Bureau, which fixed rates for Hamilton County; and the
Ohio Inspection Bureau which fixed rates for the remainder of the state. Id.
38 Id. Subsequently, another investigation of fire insurance rates was undertaken by the
Ohio Superintendent of Insurance in response to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Brand v.
Safford, 118 Ohio St. 56, 160 N.E. 464 (1928). In Brand, the Court held that under provisions
of the General Code, the Superintendent of Insurance had authority to investigate rate agree-
ments among fire insurers or between fire insurers and rate bureaus and to issue an order ap-
proving or disapproving such agreements. The investigation led to a report containing the re-
suits of examination of the Ohio Inspection Bureau and a history of rate reductions. C. Younger,
supra note 12.
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cooperative rate making are fairly obvious: The insurers believed that
joint action in rate making was essential to develop credible statistics be-
cause no single company had sufficient business to make its own experi-
ence a reliable guide for the future. Companies maintained that without
credible data, they were subjected to price wars, which in turn drove rates
down to uneconomical levels. The resultant prices went unnoticed until
a catastrophe occurred that destroyed insurers and caused great losses to
innocent policyholders. Faced with such a dilemma, which companies
argued resulted from rampant competition, insurers established the prac-
tice of concerted rate making.1
In 1917, three years after completion of the Ohio legislative commit-
tee's study,20 a bill was enacted that initiated Ohio's affirmative regula-
tion of fire insurance rates.2' This legislation required all fire insurers be
members of rating bureaus, whose uniform rates were to be filed with the
Superintendent of Insurance2 2 if he so requested 2 3  Price competition was
limited to uniform deviations from bureau rates. This mandatory bureau
scheme for fire insurance remained in effect until the 1940's.
As with the insurance regulation of other states, the Ohio scheme was
predicated on the belief that insurance was not commerce and was
19 C. Younger, supra note 12, at 2; Report of N.Y. Merritt Comm., supra note 14, at 2804-
07; Rose, supra note 1, at 677-81; Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Regula-
tion: The McCarran-Perguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 IIcH. L. REv. 545, 546-49
(1958).
20 The three year delay may, in part, be attributable to doubt about whether the state could
exercise affirmative control over fire insurance rates. In 1914 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the Kansas rate regulatory law, which proscribed excessive, inadequate, and discrimina-
tory rates, reasoning that it served the public interest. The statute required rate filings to be
made with the superintendent of insurance prior to the rates becoming effective. German Alli-
ance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914). See Rose, supra, note 1, at 679.
21 107 Omo LAWS 743-747 (1917). This mandatory bureau statute was repealed by the
adoption of the all-industry laws for fire insurance in 1947. See text accompanying note 29
infra.
2 2 A separate insurance department was established in 1892. 69 OHIo LAws 32 (1872).
In 1921 the Ohio Department of Insurance was made a division of the Department of Commerce.
109 OHio LAws 105 (1921). In 1957 the agency was again made a separate Department of
Insurance. CODE § 3901.01. When the agency was a division of the Department of Commerce,
the person in charge was referred to as the "Superintendent of Insurance"; the head of the De-
partment of Insurance is referred to as the "Director of Insurance."
2 3 The bill incorporated all but two committee recommendations-one that the anticom-
pact laws be extended to cover agents, and another that the general antitrust laws be amended
to cover fire insurance. The legislation provided (1) that every fire insurance company had to
maintain or be a member of a rating bureau; (2) that every rating bureau engaged in making
rates for fire insurance had to inspect every risk specifically rated by it, making a written survey
to be filed in the bureau's office and furnished to property owners upon request, (3) that the
Superintendent of Insurance could require the filing of rates and other information by the
bureau and could examine any rating bureau as deemed expedient, but not less than once
every three years; (4) that unfair discrimination between risks of essentially the same hazards
and having substantially the same degree of fire protection was prohibited; (5) that deviations
from bureau rates had to be uniform and could not be made without notice first being filed with
the bureau and the Superintendent of Insurance; and (6) that no company or bureau could enter
into any agreement which failed to comply with the legislation.
1971]
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therefore not subject to federal control.2 In 1944, however, the United
States Supreme Court decided that activities of insurers conducted across
state lines constituted interstate commerce and were therefore subject to
federal regulation.25 In response to this decision, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act26 was enacted in 1945, restoring to the states the power to regulate in-
surance. To ensure that state regulation would preempt federal jurisdic-
tion pursuant to the McCarran Act, the all-industry bills27 were drafted
and offered to the states for adoption." Rather than adopting the all-
industry approach for both fire and casualty insurance rate regulation,
Ohio chose a bifurcated system, with the all-industry approach for fire
insurance29 and file-and-use ° for previously unregulated casualty insur-
ance."1 The tack taken by Ohio, though almost singular, was logical in
view of its regulatory history. Because Ohio had a mandatory bureau32
for fire insurance, adoption of the all-industry bill for that line represented
a slightly liberalized continuation of the existing scheme. Similarly, the
permissive file-and-use plan adopted for casualty insurance did not repre-
sent a radical departure from that line's previous freedom from regula-
tion.33
Since adoption of the all-industry and file-and-use laws in 1947, rate
regulation in Ohio has undergone little change. As in the past, existing
Ohio rate regulatory legislation emphasizes the mechanics of rate-making
and regulation. The statutes detail factors which insurers or bureaus must
24 Rose, supra note 1, at 670-82.
2 5 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964). See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
2 7 Under the all-industry laws, proposed rates must be filed with the state insurance commis-
sioner prior to their use. Actual approval of rate filings is not required because rates are deemed
approved by the commisioner if not disapproved within a given number of days. The all-industry
laws are outlined in Rose, supra note 1, at 699-701. About 35 states have all-industry laws.
See N.Y. INs. DEP'T, THE PUBLIC INTEREST Now IN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
REGuLAiON 81 (1969).
28 See Rose, supra note 1, at 696-705.
2 9 See CODE ch. 3935.
30 Under file-and-use, rates and supporting materials must be filed for informational pur-
poses with the appropriate state regulatory agency. Rates become effective upon filing or on a
later date specified in the filing. About 10 states have file-and-use laws. See N.Y. INS. DEP'T,
supra note 27, at 81.
31 See CODE ch. 3937.
83213even states, including Ohio, regulated fire insurance rates through a mandatory bureau
system. Marryott, Mutual Insurance Under Rate Regulation, 15 LAw & CON-Mn,. PROB. 540,
543 (1950).
33 Prior to adoption of file-and-use, casualty insurance rates were unregulated. Purportedly,
the absence of regulation was because competition was the rule rather than the exception for
casualty insurance (particularly in the automobile lines). In addition, casualty insurance was a
relatively insignificant form of coverage during the first half of the twentieth century. See E.
PATrERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMussiONER IN THE UNITED STATES 268-69 (1927); Mertz,
The First Twenty Years-A Case-Law Commentary on Insurance Regulation Under the Com-
merce Clause, 1963-64 PROcEEDINGS, ABA INsURANCE SECON 151-61; Moser, Operation of
Independents Under the Rate Regulatory Pattern, 15 LAw & CONrTEM,. PROB. 523, 526-27
(1950).
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consider in devising rates and provide for review of procedures by the
Department of Insurance.
III. PROCEDURES GOVERNING RATE FILINGS
Under Ohio's existing regulatory legislation 4 rates must be based on
consideration of "past and prospective loss experience within and outside
this state;" "conflagration," "catastrophe," and other "physical hazards;"
"a reasonable margin for underwriting profit and contingencies;" "divi-
dends, savings, or unabsorbed premium deposits allowed or returned by
insurers to policyholders;" "past and prospective expenses both country-
wide and those specially applicable to this state;" "the experience or judg-
ment" of the filer;"' and, "all other relevant factors within and outside this
state." 3 6 Rates and supporting information must be filed with the insur-
ance department,37 but the statutes do not require actual departmental ap-
24 Two chapters of the CODE deal with regulation of property and liability insurance rates.
Chapter 3935 covers fire and inland marine insurance, CODE § 3935.02, and chapter 3937 covers
casualty insurance, including all forms of motor vehicle insurance. Id. § 3937.02. If insurance,
such as homeowners or commercial multiple peril, is subject to regulation under both Chapters
3935 and 3937, the filer may designate which chapter is applicable. Id. § 3935.02. The two
chapters, being essentially alike in their provisions, may generally be discussed together.
Today, distinctions between fire insurance and casualty insurance are virtually nonexistent.
Most companies do not limit their underwriting to one particular line. Additionally, the Ohio
Insurance Department regulates both fire and casualty coverage in basically the same manner,
notwithstanding the separate statutory provisions. A unified system of rate regulation is what in
practice exists and there is no reason why legislation should not be enacted to consolidate the
fire and casualty rate regulatory laws. See 1961 PROCEEDINcS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
INSURANCE ComussioNE s 347.
35 This requirement appears in section 3937.02(A) of the CODE, but not in section
3935.03 (C). Section 3935.04(A), however, provides that '"The information furnished in sup-
port of a filing may include the experience or judgment" of the filer. (Emphasis added.)
Perhaps the most significant factor enumerated in the statutes is "judgment." Judgment is
involved in practically every step of ratemaking, including selecting the statistical information
analyzed, assigning relative weights to the data assembled, and designing techniques to bring
all components together. Additionally, judgment plays a fundamental role in rate-making when
insurers determine classification plans and territorial boundaries, assess the competitive environ-
ment, or undertake innovations. Although rate-making may appear quite scientific, it is an inter-
pretative art based on probabilities which are subject to various external chance factors such as
storms and riots. Rate-making involves imperfect predictions, not assurances. C. KUL, & J.
HALL, CASUALTY INSURANCE 828-31 (4th ed. 1968). In A. MOWBsRAY, R. BLANCHARD, & C.
WMLLIMS, INSURANCE 416 (6th ed. 1969), the observation is made: "[J]udgment is always
present, conditions are always changing, so that precisely accurate rates are a chimera." In view
of the importance of judgment in insurance rate-making the Ohio insurance department's regu-
latory technique, discussed below, with its checks for computational errors, seems misplaced.
30 CODE §§ 3935.03(C), 3937.02(A).
37 CODE §§ 3935.04, 3937.03.
One type of insurer-the mutual protective association- is exempt from rate regulation in
Ohio. CODE § 3935.02. Undoubtedly these associations are exempt because of their small
size and informal character. Mutual protective associations generally operate at the township or
county level, insuring against limited hazards such as fire, lightning, tornadoes, and windstorms,
Each association is composed of 10 or more persons who insure one another, with the association
being empowered to assess its members to pay losses. CODE § 3939.01. There are only about 75
mutual protective associations in Ohio; they write about $12 million in an annual premiums, or
one percent of the total property and casualty insurance business. OsnO DIRECTOR Ol INSUR-
ANC, 104TH ANNUAL REPoRT, 2-3 (1971).
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proval of rates. A particular insurer may meet the filing requirement
either directly by filing with the department,38 or indirectly through the
filing of a licensed rate bureau of which the insurer is a member or sub-
scriber and whose rates the insurer adopts.8 9 Moreover, insurers may deviate
from bureau rates.40
A. Rate Bureaus and Advisory Organizations
Rate bureaus developed in the late 1800's.41  Their primary purpose
was and still is to assure that rates are derived from as broad a statistical
base as possible and to assure rate reliability. However, rate bureaus do
not confine themselves to gathering statistical data and making rates.
Their functions may also include establishing underwriting rules, prepar-
ing and promulgating policy forms, and making rating and loss-preven-
tion inspections.42 An indication of their significant role in the insurance
industry lies in the fact that bureaus spend millions of dollars annually
for staff activities.43 Because policy making committees are composed
3 8 CODE §§ 3935.04(A), 3937.03 (A).
391I §§ 3935.04(B), 3937.03(B).
40 Section 3935.07 of the CODE provides that a member or subscriber of a rate bureau may
make written application to the insurance department for permission to deviate from bureau
rates or rules. The application must specify the basis for the modification and a copy of the
application must be sent to the bureau. Unless the bureau waives its rights, the department is
required to set a time and place for a hearing at which the insurer and bureau may appear.
Once the department permits a deviation for fire or inland marine insurance, it is in effect for
one year unless, upon department approval, it is terminated sooner.
The extent to which this deviation procedure is used is one gauge for determining the ex-
tent of existing rate competition. In the 1950's, outside Ohio, some bureaus had a policy of
challenging all deviation applications. The hearing procedure has been criticzed as stifling
competition and hindering independent action. See Rose, supra note 1, at 718-720. In the
early 1960's the National Assotiation of Insurance Commissioners and the United States Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly recommended that rate bureaus be denied
the right to challenge deviation filings. 1963 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF IN-
SURANCE COMMISSIONERS 348, 351, 651-62, 654-66; 1962 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL ASSOCI-
ATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 502-05, 516; 1961 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL ASSOCi-
ATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 346-48; S. REP. No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13,
122-23 (1961). At present, bureaus operating in Ohio waive their right to a hearing as a
matter of practice. Ohio Department of Insurance response to a questionnaire of the Ohio Leg-
islative Service Commission, infra note 55.
Under section 3937.06 of the CODE the deviation procedure for casualty insurance differs in
several ways from that for fire and inland marine insurance under section 3935.07. Section
3937.06 provides that there may be deviations based on "a uniform percentage decrease or in-
crease to be applied to the premiums produced by the rating system." By statute deviations for
casualty insurance are effective immediately when filed with the department and remain in effect
until withdrawn by the insurer or disapproved by the department There is no real basis for the
variations between CODE sections 3935.07 and 3937.06. The differences apparently exist be-
cause Ohio adopted the all-industry bill for fire insurance and a file-and-use bill for casualty in-
surance. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
41 See notes 9-18 supra and accompanying text.
4 2 G. HARTMAN, supra 15, at 82.
4 3 For example, one rating bureau's Statement of Income and Expenses for the Year Ending
December 31, 1967, showed total expenses of almost $2,500,000. It had a staff of over 200.
Rate bureau response to a questionnaire of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, infra note
55.
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largely of insurance company executives,44 bureaus obviously afford signif-
icant opportunities for companies to engage in collusive, anticompetitive
actions furthering the interests of insurers rather than those of insureds.Y5
Yet the Ohio Department of Insurance appears relatively unconcerned
about bureau practices, confining its attention almost exclusively to licens-
ing bureaus.
Sections 3935.06 and 3937.05 of the Ohio Revised Code prescribe the
method by which a rate bureau may obtain a license. The process is rather
simple. The bureau must (1) file a copy of its constitution, rules, and
membership and subscriber lists, (2) submit the name and address of its
agent within the state who will be subject to service of process, and (3)
provide a statement of the bureau's qualifications as a rate-making organi-
zation. The license must be renewed every three years. As a means of
controlling bureau practices, the Code requires that the insurance depart-
ment examine licensees at least once every five years. However, in spite
of this statutory directive requiring periodic examinations, the department
has apparently examined only two rate bureaus in the last five years."' The
department may consider rate bureau examinations not worthwhile because
the statutes fail to articulate the purposes and applicable criteria of the ex-
aminations. Statutory changes are needed to delineate and strengthen de-
partment control over rate bureaus.
Along with rate bureaus, advisory organizations have a pervasive
influence over property and casualty rates. Sections 3935.12 and 3937.09
of the Ohio Revised Code define advisory organizations as "every group,
association, or other organization of insurers ... which assists insurers...
in rate-making, by the collection and furnishing of loss or expense statistics
or by the submission of recommendations, but which do not make filings"
pursuant to other provisions of the rate regulatory statutes.
Apparently the Ohio Department of Insurance has never exercised its
express statutory authority to examine advisory organizations and conduct
hearings to determine whether those organizations have violated the law. r
This is rather startling since, according to the Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, ad-
visory organizations exercise a profound influence over property and casu-
alty rates, which would suggest that such organizations adversely affect
rate competition. As noted by the Subcommittee:
44 G. HARThfAN, supra note 15, at 83.
45 See generally S. REP. No. 831, supra note 40, at 10, 21-66 (1961).40 The two bureaus-the Ohio Bureau of Casualty Insurers and the Western Actuarial Bureau.
(doing business as the Ohio Inspection Bureau)-were examined in 1968. In the last 20 years
it appears that the Ohio insurance department has conducted six examinations-the two in 1968,
one in 1960, and three in 1953. OHio DMCrTOR OF INSURANCE, 94th ANNUAL REPoAR
vii, 14 (1961); OHIO DIREcTOR OF INSURANCE, 87th ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1954). The
examinations in 1968 are not shown in the director's annual report.
47 See CODE §§ 3935.12(C), 3937.09(C).
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It is manifest that State insurance departments have not been sufficiently
aware of the scope of the activities engaged in by these advisory organiza-
tions. The failure of the States to take effective action or even be cogni-
zant of the nationwide plan to retard the competitive process is a serious
indictment of State regulation.48
Aside from the Senate Subcommittee's report, information concerning ad-
visory organization is generally unavailable.49  That which is available-
material required to be filed with the state--fails to provide any insight
into the organizations' actual operations.
Existing legislation for rate bureaus and advisory organizations should
be amended to bring them under stricter surveillance by the Ohio Depart-
ment of Insurance. As a guide to such amendment, two different model
laws may be considered. One law, proposed for the District of Columbia,
represents an outgrowth of an investigation and report on insurance rates,
rating organizations, and state regulation, conducted and prepared by the
Subcommitte on Antitrust and Monopoly of the United States Senate's
Committee on the Judiciary.51 Under the D.C. bill, any organization seek-
ing to exercise influence or control over the rate-making process would
be required to maintain complete minutes of all board, committee, and
subcommittee meetings, as well as membership meetings. In addition,
rate bureaus and advisory organizations would be required to file consider-
able data with the state, including all recommendations submitted to in-
surers and others. Furthermore, the bill requires that each bureau or
advisory organization be examined periodically and prohibits them from
engaging in anti-competitive activities, including promulgation of rules or
programs having the effect of requiring insurers to adhere to rates or pre-
venting insurers from acting independently. In addition, it clothes the in-
surance department with authority to proceed against acts or practices
deemed unfair, unreasonable, or having the effect of substantially lessening
competition.
The other model law for controlling rate bureaus and advisory organi-
zations has been adopted in Wisconsin 2  The Wisconsin law is aimed at
"rate service organizations," defined as any persons assisting insurers in
rate-making or filing. The Wisconsin law details extensive powers by
which the insurance department may examine rate service organizations at
48 S. R P. No. 831, supra note 40, at 124.
49 See G. HARTMAN, supra note 15, at 157-62.
"0 CODE sections 3935.12 (D) and 3937.09(D) forbid insurers and rate bureaus from using
information or adopting recommendations of an advisory organization that has failed to file with
the department (1) a copy of its constitution and rules, (2) a membership list, (3) the name
and address of an Ohio residence for service of process, and (4) an agreement that the depart-
ment may examine the organization whenever expedient.
51 S. 568, § 9, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
52 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 625.35 (West Supp. 1970). The Wisconsin insurance code is under-
going extensive revision. One of the purposes of the revision is to provide other states model
legislation.
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intervals established by departmental rule. Reports of these examinations
are to be made available for public inspection. The demerit with respect
to the Wisconsin law is that it seems to emphasize curbing deleterious
activities through informal arrangements between the insurance depart-
ment and rate service organizations and through publicity. This weakness
in the Wisconsin law could be eliminated if various anti-competitive be-
havior by insurers and rates service organizations were expressly pro-
scribed M and if the department or any person injured in his business or
property were permitted to maintain an action to enjoin the proscribed con-
duct and to recover damages.n4
B. Approval of Rates
Once filed with the Ohio Department of Insurance, rates become effec-
tive either immediately, or within a specified period of time. Under section
3935.04(D) of the Ohio Revised Code property rates become effective
after being on file for fifteen days, and this period may be extended by
the insurance department for another fifteen days. If not disapproved
during the waiting period, the filings are deemed approved. Conversely,
under section 3937.03 (C) casualty rates may be effective immediately upon
filing with the department 15,
G3 See note 51 supra and accompanying text. Agreements among insurers or rating organi-
zations to adhere to any rate should be expressly proscribed. A ban on pricing agreements
would reduce cartelization of the market by rate bureaus. Bureaus should be permitted to collect
and pool statistical experience of insurers (an essential function of credible ratemaking), but
each insurer should be free to set its own rates, thereby encouraging price variation.
There is little support for the position that rate bureaus should be abolished. They perform
valuable functions by developing credible statistics and offering related services at a reasonable
cost and by permitting an efficient use of scarce talents. See Williams, Insurers Views on Prop-
erty and Liability Insurance Rate Regulation, 36 J. RIsK & INS. 217, 233 (1969). But see
Woodward & Fondiller, Inc, Report of Actuaries, Virginia Bureau of Insurance Case No. 17680,
at 9-10 (1966).
54 New York has recently adopted these measures. N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 177, 179 (McKinney
Supp. 1970). See also CAL. INS. CODE § 1853.6 (West 1955) (prohibiting agreements to ad-
here to rates). The New York statute is discussed in Killen, New York's New Rating Law Poses
Unexpected Problems, BEST'S REviEw, Feb. 1970, at 10 (property-liability ed.).
55 Although the statutes do not require nor provide for actual department approval of rates,
seldom do insurers or bureaus implement rates without approval. In a questionnaire sent
to 276 insurers and 13 rate bureaus operating in Ohio, most of the 65 insurers and 6 bureaus
responding (representing 75 percent of the premium volume in Ohio for property and casualty
insurance) indicated that they obtained advanced rate approval from the department. This
questionnaire was distributed by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission in 1968 to all domestic
property and casualty companies and all out-of-state companies writing more than $100,000 of
direct premiums annually in Ohio for property and casualty coverage, as well as to all 13 rate
bureaus licensed by the state. (A related questionnaire was submitted to the Ohio Department
of Insurance by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission in 1968.) In seeking advanced ap-
proval, however, inordinate delays may result. One insurer reported "an isolated instance" of
the departments not approving a filing for almost four years.
Both the all-industry and the file-and-use systems are aimed at precluding unnecessary de-
lays in ratemaking and regulation, thereby allowing rates to be responsive to present circum-
stances. Additionally, they are designed to relieve the insurance department of the unduly bur-
densome task of reviewing all filings and the attendant pressures to withhold its imprimatur for
an unpopular filing, by placing the burden of defending rates on insurers or bureaus.
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Once rates become effective, the insurance department can suspend
them after it has given notice,56 conducted a hearing, and issued a valid
order. To be binding, the order must specify in what respects the rates
fail to comply with the applicable statutory provisions and the effective
date of the order. The procedure is, however, rarely used and has not
resulted in disapproval of an Ohio filing.17  This is true in part because
the department does not systematically review filings once they become ef-
fective. More importantly, the lack of department action to suspend
rates may perhaps be attributed to the fact that rates are approved as they
are submitted to the department prior to their being implemented.
C. Basic Legislative Standards for Rates
Ohio Revised Code sections 3935.03 (B) and 3937.02 (D) provide that
property and casulty rates may not be "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly
discriminatory." Although this proscription is the core provision of Ohio's
rate regulatory legislation, the standards articulated are not defined in the
Code. Indeed, there are few guidelines in Ohio's rate regulatory legisla-
tion which may be referred to in order to construe the words "excessive,"
"inadequate," and "unfairly discriminatory." After examining the legisla-
tion, one can conclude little more than that in Ohio the goals of rate reg-
ulation are reasonableness, adequacy, and equity,58 terms that may be
nothing more than expressions of generally perceived human aspirations
concerning the insurance enterprise.
56 Sections 3935.05(C) and 3937.04(A) of the CODE require 10 and 20 days' notice, respec-
tively, prior to suspension of rates by the department.
57 Ohio Department of Insurance response to questionnaire of the Ohio Legislative Service
Commission, supra note 55. The department simply does not have time to review old filings on
its own initiative unless, upon a complaint, an error is revealed. Moreover, in an inflationary
economy filings are revised rather frequently, significantly reducing the number of existing filings
that could be reviewed.
58 Arguably, in an increasingly safety conscious society, encouragement of loss-preventive
activities should be a major goal of rate regulation. However, substantial difficulties militate
against focusing heavily on the loss-prevention objective for the mass market personal lines.
Although inducement of loss-preventive practices among individual insureds is laudable, no one
knows how successful such techniques as safe driver discounts are in deterring casualty-produc-
ing behavior, or how to improve the present system of incentives. See Mortimer, Let's Hear
From the Insurance Consumer, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 499, 503 (1969). From a practical stand-
point it is doubtful that the reward or penalty offered individual insureds is enough to influence
their conduct appreciably. Moreover, true cause and effect relationships between rate credits
and loss-preventive factors are difficult in identify and measure, especially for private passenger
automobile coverage. See TEMPLE UNIV. INS. DEP'T, A TOTAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY o
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 11-16 (1968). In fact, it has been alleged that credits are subject
to abuse since companies may use them as a competitive weapon to discriminate unfairly in favor
of preferred customers. R. MEHR & F. COMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 795-96 (4th
ed. 1966). Social policy, more than underwriting policy, makes reduction of economic and hu-
man losses an underlying objective of the insurance industry. Indirect financial gains, however,
may accrue to insurers since such supposed loss-prevention schemes as safe driver and driver
education discounts attract business. More efficacious means of reducing losses include strict
traffic law and building code enforcement, better highway engineering, and large scale vehicle
and building inspections. By reducing the number and size of claims, these direct means should
ultimately have a greater impact on property and casualty rate levels than safety discounts. For
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There appear to be two facets of the goal of rate reasonableness: one
concerning the relationship of rates to insurer costs and reasonable profits,
and the other concerning economic feasibility of rates in terms of what
insureds can afford to pay. In deciding to permit concerted action through
rate bureaus and advisory organizations under the umbrella of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act, Ohio and most other states validated an activity
through which, in the absence of public control, industry members may
collusively fix prices and secure excessive rates. These excessive rates may
be reflected not only in the magnitude of profits, but also in the size and
nature of operating expenses passed on to the public through rates. A
proscription against excessive rates is necessary to prevent exploitation of
the public through concerted action. Recently, there has emerged a grow-
ing concern about the other aspect of reasonableness-economic feasibility
of rates for mass market personal lines. The concern is based on the prem-
ise that insureds must be able to afford the price charged and feel that
the insurance provided is worth the cost. The concept of economic feasi-
bility rests on the idea that insurance of one form or another is such a vital
ingredient for the effective functioning of the economy and the social sys-
tem that no one should be denied it. 9 This idea may be gaining accep-
tance, as evidenced by the public outcry over automobile insurance costs.
Ultimately, the concept of economic feasibility of insurance rates may
achieve recognition by tax-supported, government-administered programs
which provide subsidized protection for some insureds, by insurers charg-
ing a basic premium that everyone can afford-the costs in excess of the
base premium being absorbed by the government through re-insurance or
by direct subsidy payments to insurers, or by insurers being compelled to
distribute broadly among their customers the special costs of certain classes
of high risks.60
a discussion of the view that insurance regulation of the mass market personal lines can foster
loss control and prevention, see Denenberg, Meeting the Insurance Crisis of Our Cities: An
Industry in Revolution 1970 INS. L.J. 205, 216-18. See also S. HUEBNER, K. BLACK & R.
CLINE, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 506-19 (1968).
Mandatory deductibles are another means of encouraging loss-preventive practices by indi-
vidual insureds. Moreover, mandatory deductibles are justified on several other grounds. With-
out a deductible provision a portion of the premiums simply represents prepayment of future
minor losses in the nature of maintenance expenses. Mandatory deductibles may improve the
operating efficiency of insurers by reducing overhead costs of administration in processing small
losses: costs which often exceed the amount of the claims. Also, they may reduce the inclination
of insurers to cancel policies or to refuse to renew them because of poor experience resulting
from small claims.
59 See, e.g., PREsIDENT's NAT'L ADvISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECTED
AREAS, MEETING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIES 1 (1968); C. KULP & J. HALL,
CASUALTY INSURANCE 418-23 (4th ed. 1968); In re Filing Made by N.C. Fire Ins. Rating
Bureau, 165 S.Y. 207, 219 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1969).
60 Puerto Rico has adopted a "social protection plan" for automobile accident victims.
The plan is administered, funded, and its solvency guaranteed by the government for a $35 fee
paid by every person registering a motor vehicle. Aponte & Denenberg, The Automobile Prob-
lem in Puerto Rico: Dimensions and Proposed Solution, 1968 INS. L.J. 884 (1968); Aponte &
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Adequacy reflects the fundamental purpose of insurance-to mini-
mize losses of insureds who may encounter severe and unpredictable finan-
cial adversity.6' Rates must be adequate not only to generate an insurance
fund sufficient for paying legitimate claims and the related costs of han-
dling them, but also to offset the drain on surplus resulting from an in-
creasing number of policyholders, to provide for expanding contingency
reserves, and to provide stock insurers a means to assure a return to in-
vestors. 2
The legislative prescription for adequate rates was primarily influenced
by the large number of insurance company failures in the 1800's.1a Re-
cently, however, the thesis has been developed and documented that rate
levels have had little to do with insurer insolvencies. 64 Admittedly with
respect to any insurer, total premiums and investment income must be
sufficient to sustain the enterprise; insolvency is inevitable if in the long
run premiums plus investment income do not equal or exceed claims plus
expenses. But today no company seeks to employ patently inadequate
rates. Consequently, state insurance commissioners rarely order insurers
to increase rates to avert insolvencies. 65
Equitable rates may be considered from the standpoint of economic and
social considerations. From an economic standpoint, rates must be fixed
Denenberg, The Social Protection Plan, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Sept. 1968, at 40 (property-liability
ed.).
Under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 the secretary of HUD is authorized
to offer crime insurance at "affordable rates" if he finds "a critical market unavailability situa-
tion." Pub. L. No. 91-609, §§ 601-604 (Dec. 31, 1970).
Ol S. HUBNER, K. BLACK & R. CLINE, supra note 58, at 6-7.
62 See ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC, PRICES AND PROFITS IN THE PROPERTY AND LIABILITY
INSURANCE INDUSRY 23-40 (1968); Crowe, Evaluating Rate Making Systems, 17 ANNALS,
SOCIETY OF CHARTERED PROPERTY & CASUALTY UNDERWRITERS 213, 215-18 (1964).
6 3 
In the 1800's, when the insurance industry was free of government rate regulation, more
than 3,000 fire insurers failed. These failures were allegedly due to "the frequently excessive
competition" that "forced premiums down to uneconomic levels and ultimately drove companies
out of existence." S. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 94 (1960).
64 Insolvendes are attributable to three basic causes, none of which are controllable by rate
regulation because they are unrelated to prices: (1) fortuitous events such as catastrophic losses
and economic depressions; (2) inept management as manifested through marketing errors, lax
underwriting standards, and imprudent investments; and (3) venal management engaged in vari-
ous "milking" schemes. N.Y. INS. DEP'T, THE PUBLIC INTEREST Now IN PROPERTY AND
LIABILITY INSURANCE REGULATION 56 (1969). A former Michigan commissioner of insur-
ance has stated succinctly: "Neither rate regulation nor any other governmental requirement can
ensure adequate rates. Only competent company management and better statistical and actuarial
techniques than have, in general, been used by property insurers, can do that." Mayerson,
Some Considerations in Regulation of Rates, INSURANCE, Dec. 23, 1967, at 15, 19. See also
ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC, supra note 62, at 8, 56-57; Kaplan, Regulation for Insolvency, 3
FORUM 168 (1968); BENNETT, Liquidations of Insurance Companies, in INSURANCE AND
GOVERNMENT 197 (C. Center & R. Heins eds. 1962); Mertz, Discussion of Rate Regulation
Revisited, in INSURANCE AND GOVERNMENT 418, 423-25 (C. Center & R. Heins eds. 1962);
Morrill, Discussion on the Economics and Principles of Insurance Supervision, in INSURANCE
AND GOVERNmENT 87, 89-90 (C. Center & R. Heins eds. 1962).
6 5 AMayerson, Ensuring the Solvency of Property and Liability Insurance Companies, in
INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT AND SOcIAL POLICY 146 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969).
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in such a way that a policyholder or each homogeneous group of policy-
holders pays his or their proportionate share of the insurer's losses and
expenses. Economic equity is justified because it results in efficient alloca-
tion of resources among competing uses, a guiding tenet of any economic
system. 6e From a social standpoint, equity suggests that individuals should
not be required to pay higher rates than others owing to factors over which
they have little or no control, such as race,67 geographical location,68 or
involvement in a casualty for which the insured was not at fault.6" Social
equity stresses equality, which in this context may be achieved only by
deemphasizing or even ignoring loss and expense costs attributable to an
individual policyholder or a group of policyholders who has willfully done
nothing to increase the risk.7'  To achieve economic fairness by employing
actuarial techniques, one should refine his data as much as possible, and
the smaller the classes or groups the greater the possibility that distinctions
will arise which reflect social inequities and that rates will reinforce in-
equities.
One difficulty in attempting to achieve social equity through insurance
rates is that rates are a rather indirect means of attacking the problem.
Even if state regulation of property and casualty insurance rates were
designed so that all insureds found premiums to be within their means,
the effect upon social justice would be negligible.7 In addition, those
GuSee Williams, Price Discrimination in Property and Liability Insurance, in INSURANcE,
GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 209, 217 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969).
0 7 Although CODE sections 3911.16-.19 prohibit life insurance companies or their repre-
sentatives from discriminating among insureds on the basis of race by charging different rates,
there is no such express proscription for property and casualty insurance. The portions of the
CODE, §§ 3935.03 (B) and 3937.02 (D), pertaining to property and casualty insurance, merely
provide: "Rates shall not be... unfairly discriminatory." However, in 1965, the Ohio Director
of Insurance issued a bulletin indicating that these sections prohibit discrimination on the basis
of race. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, BULLETIN No. 45 (May 14, 1965).68 OIO DE PARTMENT OF INSURANCE, BULLETIN No. 45 (May 14, 1965) provides: "If
a company establishes that a certain hazard is present in all risks located in a given area, this
factor may be taken into account in making underwriting decisions concerning those risks. On
the other hand, general characteristics such as type of neighborhood may not be used indiscrimi-
nately as applied to all risks located in the given area."
09 For private passenger automobile insurance, because careless driving is frequently hard
to distinguish from usual practice, inferior risks may be difficult to identify with any satisfactory
degree of accuracy solely on the basis of prior involvement in accidents. This assertion is but-
tressed by estimates that one collision occurs for every 61,000 miles a car is driven, one near-
collision every 500 miles, and one driving error every two miles. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL,
BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VIcTIm: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMO-
BILE INSURANCE 16 (1965).
7 0 For the view that economic equity should be deemphasized to achieve social equity, see
C. KULP & J. HALL, supra note 59, at 475-77.
71 Any estimate would depend on the extent to which the state regulatory system sought
to adjust rates to achieve social justice. No one has detailed the extent to which rates should be
so adjusted. Premium costs for private passenger automobile coverage give some idea of any
adjustment. The average annual premium for a fairly standard policy for automobile protec-
tion in Ohio is probably about $150. See H.R. REP. No. 815, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1967).
Downward rate adjustments of about 50 percent, which would seem highly unlikely under any
modified regulatory pattern, would result in a premium cut of $75.
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benefited would generally be only those with property to insure. Cer-
tainly welfare programs offer a more direct means of achieving social
justice or equity than do insurance rates.72  Absent support for a social
insurance system for property and casualty coverage, there is no more rea-
son why some insureds should be charged higher rates to subsidize the less
affluent than there is for varying the price of automobiles, replacement
tires, gasoline, oil, or parking fees to achieve social justice, and apparently
there is little public interest for such reform on a large scale.
In defining "excessive" the Ohio Department of Insurance on one
occasion endorsed the California approach.7 3  Under California's stan-
dards, whether rates are excessive is determined by examining the existing
degree of competition or by comparing rates being charged for similar
coverage. In practice, however, the department's approach has not rested
on an application of California standards but rather on the level of under-
writing profits. Under this approach, if it is determined by use of a formula74
that a rate has provided or will provide an underwriting return or a profit
above a certain target level, the rate is characterized as excessive. Applica-
tion of this formula approach and the lack of concern for establishing its
validity are illustrated by the Ohio department's handling of a filing by the
Allstate Insurance Company.
In 1967 Allstate made a filing with the Ohio Department of Insurance
72 For a discussion of the use of insurance premiums to redistribute income, see Blanchard,
Government Regulation of Business, J. Am. INs., May 1945, at 16.
7 3 See CAL. INS. CODE § 1852(w) (West 1955). The Ohio department's recognition of the
California definition is evidenced by the following statement "No rate shall be held to be exces-
sive unless (1) such rate is unreasonably high for the insurance coverage provided and (2) a rea-
sonable degree of competition does not exist in the area with respect to the classification to which
such rate is applicable." Ohio Department of Insurance response to a questionnaire by the
Ohio Legislative Service Commission, supra note 55. (This statement is a direct quote from §
1852 of the CALIFORNIA INSURANCE CODE.)
In 1969 the department indicated that excessive rates were of little concern since competition
would keep rates down, the fundamental problem being whether rates were inadequate as to
cause insolvencies. Ohio Department of Insurance response to a questionnaire by the Legislative
Service Commission, supra note 55.
Of the insurers and rate bureaus responding to a 1968 questionnaire, supra note 55, none
thought that the department was following the California definitions. The questionnaire asked,
"In your opinion, what factors does the Ohio Insurance Department consider in determining
whether a rate is excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory?" Almost all insurers stated
that they did not know. These responses may be all too accurate, for as one commentator has
remarked, "There probably are as many interpretations of the rate standards as there are mem-
bers of the industry." F. CRANE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE REGULATON 103 (1962).
74 On its face the provision that "rates shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly dis-
criminatory" appears to establish a "zone of reasonableness,' between the maxima and minima
within which a carrier is free to fix its charges. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R.,
294 U.S. 499, 506 (1935). However, in processing rate filings the Ohio Department of Insur-
ance uses formulae to determine whether the statutory standards are satisfied. The formulae
identify loss, expense, and profit components of rates and prescribe what percentage of each rate
is allocable to the components. The Ohio department formulae allow five percent of casualty
rates for profits and contingencies and six percent of fire rates for profits and catastrophes. The
formula applied to fire rates was devised in 1921. 1922 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONVEN-
TION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 19. See generally Jeffery, Standard Profit Formula, 19
ANNALS, SOCIETY OF CASUALTY & PROPERTY UNDERWRITERS 307 (1966).
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for automobile liability and collision coverage. The department chal-
lenged the filing on the ground that the new rates were excessive since
Allstate had made almost a seven percent underwriting profit on its auto-
mobile liability and collision coverage the previous year. Because such
underwriting profit exceeded the five percent target level under the de-
partment's formula, Allstate's rate increase was deemed excessive. All-
state's new rates, however, were ten to fifteen percent below those of
other companies writing a significant portion of Ohio's auto business. The
department notified Allstate that a hearing would be held to determine
whether its rates complied with the statutory standards as interpreted by
the department, but the hearing was postponed. In late 1968 the depart-
ment reportedly informed Allstate that its challenge would not be
pursued.76
The standard of "inadequacy" has also been a subject of confusion.
The Ohio Department of Insurance has indicated that its concern with the
standard of inadequacy is whether given rates tend to endanger company
solvency or eliminate competition.76 Nevertheless, as with the standard
of excessiveness, the department has focused on the level of underwriting
profits to evaluate adequacy of rates. Several years ago, when examin-
ing the rates of a company whose overall financial condition was critically
unsound, the department reportedly took the position that the insurer's
rates were inadequate because they did not generate the underwriting profits
called for under the department's rate formulae. Whether the depart-
ment would regard as inadequate a rate which may produce an underwrit-
ing profit below that proscribed by the department's rate formula for a
financially sound insurer is unknown; apparently the issue has never arisen.
There are, of course, practical limits to what the department can do
to combat rate inadequacy. The department has no authority to fix ade-
quate rates; it can only determine whether specific rates meet statutory re-
quirements. If the department were to disapprove rates as being too low,
the public would believe that the department is insensitive to consumer
interests, and insurers would allege that the department unduly interfers
75 Citizen-Journal (Columbus, Ohio), Aug. 3, 1968, at 13, col. 1. See Insurance Industry
Hearings, supra note 14, pt. 14, at 8721.
In late 1966 the Kentucky insurance department (apparently applying standards similar
to those applied by the Ohio department) determined that Allstate's proposed rates were exces-
sive. Rate Adjustment of Allstate Ins. Co., Order of Ky. Comm'n of Ins. 4 (Nov. 9, 1966).
For an attack on interpreting "excessive" in terms of an individual company's profit level,
see Moser, Operation of Independents under the Rate Regulatory Pattern, 15 LAw & CoNTEmp.
PRop. 523, 529-35 (1950).
70 In defining "inadequate" rates the Ohio department again used the language of the Cali-
fornia Code. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1852(a) (West 1955). The language of the department,
which is essentially that found in section 1852 of the California Code, reads: "No rate shall
be held to be inadequate unless such rate is unreasonably low for the insurance coverage pro-
vided and is insufficient to sustain projected losses and expenses; or unless such rate is unreason-
ably low for the insurance coverage provided and the use of such rate has, or if continued, will
have, the effect of destroying competition or creating a monopoly." Ohio Department of Insur-
ance response to a questionnaire of the Ohio Legislative Service Commssion, supra note 55.
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with managment prerogatives. Also, there is the danger that companies
would be priced out of the market if the department refused to allow cov-
erage to be written at rates below certain levels. For these reasons the
Ohio department focuses little attention on the adequacy of rates, relying on
the belief that out of economic self-interest insurers will not employ in-
adequate rates.77
Absent express statutory definitions for "excessive" and "inadequate,"
the difficulty encountered in construing these terms has led commentators,
state officials outside Ohio, and insurers to conclude that the statutory tests
to determine whether rates are inadequate or excessive should be more
specific.78 The tests proposed are similar to those applicable in California
for over two decades, and which the Ohio Department of Insurance re-
ferred to on one occasion.79  The California rate law provides:
No rate shall be held to be excessive unless (1) such rate is unreason-
ably high for the insurance provided and (2) a reasonable degree of com-
petition does not exist in the area with respect to the dassification to
which the rate is applicable.
No rate shall be held to be inadequate unless (1) such rate is unrea-
sonably low for the insurance provided and (2) the continued use of
such rate endangers the solvency of the insurer using the same, or (3) such
rate is unreasonably low for the insurance provided and the use of such
rate by the insurer using same has, or if continued will have, the effect of
destroying competition or creating a monopoly.80
77 nsurers writing coverage in Ohio and elsewhere agree that state insurance regulators re-
gard "excessive" as a more important standard than "inadequate." 1967 PROCEEDINGS, NA-
TIONAL ASsocIATIoN OF INSURANCE CozMMIssioNERs 400.
78 F. CRAN, supra note 73, at 110. Former Ohio Superintendent of Insurance Vorys has
admitted: "I defy any casualty actuary .. .to predict with certainty what any given commis-
sioner will do with any rate filing made pursuant to our rating laws. The lack of definite
standards against which a rate may be approved or disapproved is or should be of real concern."
Vorys, The Responsibilities of the Insurance Commissioner, in 1957 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (1971).
Virtually no one believes that the existing standards of excessiveness, inadequacy, and unfair
discrimination should be eliminated from the rate regulatory laws. See 1967 PROCEEDINGS,
NATIONAL AssocIAToN OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 447-49, 471-86; Williams, Insurer
Views on Property and Liability Insurance Rate Regulation, 36 J. RISK & INS. 217, 230-31
(1969).
79 Note 73 supra & accompanying text In response to a question about the definitons of
"excessive, inadequate, and unfairly discriminatory," almost all insurers who answered the ques-
tion and who operate in Ohio indicated that they preferred the California approach. In 1969,
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners concluded that "... where appropriate, re-
liance be placed upon fair and open competition to produce and maintain reasonable and com-
petitive prices for insurance coverages.... .1969 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL ASSOcIATION
OF INSURANCE COMIISSIONERS 310.
80 CAL. INS. CODE § 1852(a) (West 1955). Recently, several states have adopted the Cal-
ifornia definitions. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-5241(4) (Burns Supp. 1970); GA.
CODE ANN. § 56-507(a) (Supp. 1970).
In Minnesota and Wisconsin excessiveness and inadequacy are defined somewhat differ-
ently: "Rates are presumed not to be excessive if a reasonable degree of price competition exists.
.." "If such competition does not exist, rates are excessive if they are likely to produce a long-
run profit that is unreasonably high in relation to the riskiness of the class of business, or if ex-
penses are unreasonably high in relation to the services rendered." Rates are inadequate if they
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In a model bill drafted for the District of Columbia, the definition of
"excessive" is identical to California's. 81  The definition of "inadequate,"
however, differs in that it is based on a determination of underwriting loss
rather than competition or solvency. "Inadequate" as used in the
D.C. bill is defined as follows: "No rate shall be held to be inade-
quate which upon reasonable assumptions of prospective loss and expense
experience will not produce an underwriting loss."82 As a guide to "rea-
sonable assumptions of prospective loss and expense experience," the
D.C. bill enumerates various factors for consideration, such as past loss and
expense experience in addition to catastrophe and conflagration hazards.
In the California and District of Columbia legislation use of com-
petition as the basic standard for determining excessive rates allows the
insurance department to rely upon the economic forces of the market
place to ensure that rates will be reasonable. So long as competitive con-
ditions exist, detailed scrutiny of rate filings to detect excessive rates may
be largely dispensed with. However, in determining whether a reason-
able degree of competition exists, the Ohio Department of Insurance would
have to consider competitive factors on which it does not now focus, such
as the number of effective sellers, the relative freedom of entry of firms
into the market, the independence of rivals, the extent of predatory and
preclusive practices, the rate of industry growth, the character of market
incentives to competitive moves, the degree of product differentiation and
homogeneity, the extent of price competition, the presence or absence of
excess capacity, and the nature of price discrimination.83  Although con-
sideration of such factors would place a new burden on the department,
the need for a more explicit definition of "excessive" is paramount, and
indications are that sufficient competition exists in Ohio to assure that the
California definition is workable.8
endanger the solidity of the insurer that uses them or if they are insufficient to sustain projected
losses and expenses. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 70A.04 (West Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
625.11 (West Supp. 1970).
81 S. 568, § 3, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
82 Id.
8 3 The elements for determining competitive behavior were set forth in the REPORT OF THE
A'rroRNiy GENERAL's NATIONAL COM1inT=EE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 324-37
(1954). In the context of insurance rate regulation, they are developed in F. CRANE, supra note
73, at 110-121.84 Afore than 500 fire and casualty insurers operate in Ohio; approximately 140 property and
casualty companies have their home offices there. This number is exceeded by only six other
states. OHIO DIRECTOR OF INSURANCE, 104TH ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1971); INSURANCE IN-
FORMATION INSTITUTE, INSURANCE FACTS 1970, at 8 (1970).
The Ohio market structure does not appear unduly concentrated in favor of any particular
company. In terms of premium volume, the 10 leading property and casualty companies in
Ohio write about 40 percent of the total business, and the leading 20 companies write about
55 percent OHIO DIRECrOR OF INSURANE, 104TH ANNUAL REPORT 22-45 (1971). Pre-
mium volume is the most meaningful measure of concentration in the insurance industry. F.
CRANE, supra note 73, at 36; R. HENSLEY, COMPETITION, REGULATION AND TE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST IN NONLIFE INSURANCE 28 (1963). Formation of property and casualty insurance
companies under Ohio's law and admission of out-of-state insurers appear relatively easy. In the
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With respect to a definition for "inadequacy," the District of Columbia
definition, based on a determination of underwriting loss, has the merit
of being more concise and objective than California's definition which fo-
cuses on unfair pricing and company solvency. The D.C. bill also reflects
the view, supported by empirical evidence, that solvency of carriers is not
closely related to rates.8 5 However, underwriting loss relates only to a
comparison of claim losses and operating expenses with premiums and
does not take account of insurers' investment income. Since the California
definition is not limited to the underwriting facet of the property
and casualty enterprise,86 it is more comprehensive. Regardless of which
is the better definition, Ohio needs definitive legislative definitions for
last decade 15 Ohio companies were licensed to do business in the state. This compares more fa-
vorably with other states such as New York, where during the last decade 21 property and liabil-
ity companies were formed and 47 foreign and alien companies were admitted to do business.
NEW YORK INS. DEP'T, supra note 64, at 87. However, from an examination of the annual
reports of the Ohio Director of Insurance, it appears that during the last twenty years no property
and casualty company has been liquidated and only eleven have had their policies reinsured.
This suggests that competition may have been moderated to achieve a level of rates high enough
to preserve inefficient, high cost insurers.
Deviation and independent rate findings are extensive. Although it is difficult to determine
and categorize the premium volume written under independent (non-bureau) and deviation rate
filings, it seems to be between 30 and 60 percent of Ohio's premium volume for property and
casualty insurance. A study of filing practices of insurers operating in Ohio shows that, depend-
ing on the type of insurer and the type of coverage, between 27 and 56 percent of those com-
panies writting fire insurance use deviated rates, with only a few using independently filed rates;
between 18 and 50 percent of those companies writing homeowners insurance use deviated
rates, with 10 to 26 percent filing independently; and between 17 and 38 percent of those com-
panies writing automobile related insurance use deviated rates, with 39 to 53 percent filing inde-
pendently. Ohio Leg. Serv. Comm. Rate Regulation in Ohio (Dec. 13, 1968 unpublished mem-
orandum). According to one insurer, in 1967 five companies, making independent filings, wrote
more than 30 percent of the automobile insurance business in Ohio. See note 55 supra. Of
8,321 filings received by the Ohio Department of Insurance in 1967, 812 were deviations and
5,054 were independent filings.
Two minor impediments to vigorous competition exist. First, reciprocal insurers are pro-
hibited from writing property damage and bodily injury coverage for private passenger auto-
mobiles principally used for nonbusiness purposes. CODE § 3931.01. Because of this restric-
tion the reciprocals operating in Ohio write only about $3.8 million of annual premiums. OHIO
DmEcTOR OF INSURANCE, 104TH ANNUAL REPORT 2-3 (1971). Section 3931.01 represents an
effort to protect local stock and mutual insurers from competition by out-of-state reciprocals.
This provincial restriction should be eliminated. Second, group property and casualty coverage
is prohibited. The absence of enabling statutes authorizing the writing of group fire, casualty,
inland marine, and surety insurance has led the Ohio Department of Insurance to take the posi-
tion that group property and casualty insurance is illegal. Field, Employee Group Property and
Liability Insurance--Revisited, BEST'S REVIEW, Sept. 1971, at 10, z (property liability ed.);
OHIO INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, BULLETIN NO. 18 (April 9, 1958). Group property and
casualty insurance lowers the cost of coverage to insureds by 15 to 20 percent and results in
greater availability of coverage through less stringent underwriting standards. Coffey, fass
Merchandising, BEST'S REVIEW, June 1968, at 100 (property-liability ed.). See generally In-
surance Industry Hearings, pt. 14, at 8320-32 (1968); CItAsnN, Group Property and Liability
Insurance, in R. EILERS & R. CROWEE, GROUP INSURANCE HANDBOOK 732 (1965); Webb,
Collective Merchandising of Automobile Insurance, 36 J. RISK & INS. 465 (1969). Resistance
to group property and casualty insurance comes from agents who fear loss or shrinkage of com-
missions. See Wall St. J., July 30, 1969, at 3, col. 4 (midwest ed.); Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1967,
at 1, col. 6 midwest ed.); OHo ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE AGENTS, AGENCY BULLETIN,
Sept. 20, 1967.
85 See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
86 Contra, F. CRANE, supra note 73, at 127-3 1.
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..excessive" and "inadequate," whether that legistlation be an adoption of
California's, the District of Columbia's, or a combination of both.
Unlike the standards of "excessive" and "inadequate," the "unfairly
discriminatory" proscription, although not defined in the statutes, has pre-
cipitated few major interpretative problems. There is general unanimity
that the proscription means that subject to practical limitations, rates for
various classes must be proportional to expected claims or losses and ex-
penses attributable to each class of insurance.8 7 In providing that rates
shall reflect the loss and expense experience, sections 3935.03(C) and
3937.02 (A) of the Ohio Revised Code indicate that this is the appropriate
interpretation. The term "unfair discrimination" is the focus of attention
in only two or three cases each year throughout the United States. 8 One
explanation for this is that evidence of discrimination rarely appears on the
face of a rate filing reviewed by state insurance departments. Unfair dis-
crimination, if it occurs at all, does not arise from the rate itself, but from
its application.
D. Administrative Practice
The deficiencies of Ohio's rate regulation are not confined to its exist-
ing statutory provisions. Administrative infirmities exist which impede
vigorous, effective regulation of property and casualty insurance rates. For
example, the department's small rating section of seven individuals89 as-
sumes a staggering task which revolves around combing through rate fil-
ings submitted by insurers and bureaus in an effort to detect errors. For
example, in 1967 the section processed about 8,700 filings °0
8 T See WILLIAMS, Price Discrimination in Property and Liability Insurance, in INSURANCE,
GoVERISLET AND SOCIAL POLICY 209, 211-12 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969);
C. WILLIAMS, PRcE DIscRIMINATIoN IN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 7, 79-83
(1959).
A type of unfair discrimination is personal discrimination effected through rebates. Section
3933.01 of the CODE proscribes such unfair personal discrimination. By implication sections
3935.09 and 3937.08 proscribe misclassifications. See notes 104-106 infra & accompanying
text.
88 See C. WILLIAMS, supra note 87, at 79.
sOApproximately 90 individuals work in the department. OIO INS. INDUS. COMM.,
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT STATISTICAL DATA, year ending December 31, 1969, at 1
(undated).
In sharp contrast to Ohio, New York's rating staff consists of 28 individuals, only four of
whom are clerical. Franson, The Prior-Approval System of Property and Liability Insurance
Rate Regulation: A Case Study, 1969 Wis. L REv. 1104, 1109.00Response to questionnaire of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, supra note 55.
This amount includes both rate and form filings. Form filings may involve such inconsequential
matters as changing the name of an insurer's officer on its policies. Form filings are handled by
the rating section since policy changes may be tantamount to rate changes. The department
estimates that up to 80 percent of all filings involve forms, leaving it with about 1,700 annual
rate filings. Id. This estimate of the number of rate filings seems accurate when compared
with figures from other states. The New York Insurance Department processes about 1,500 rate
filings a year. Franson, supra note 89, at 1115. The Non-Life Division of the Kentucky Insur-
ance Department reviews approximately 1,200 rate filings annually. R. Franson & G. Hartman,
A Study of the Administration of Kentucky Ratng Laws, KY. LEGIS. RESEARCH COMM'N REP.
No. 46, at 23 (1967).
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The rating section reports that in processing each rate filing it verifies
the adequacy of the filer's license authority; determines the kind or class
of coverage involved, including whether the coverage is new or a revision
of existing coverage and whether the filing is properly a deviation or an
independent filing; ascertains the nature and extent of departure from
present coverage; reviews comparable or analogous filings; analyzes the
proposed rating and classification system and reconciles it with the cover-
age contemplated; establishes the statistical plan's ability to produce data
justifying the classification system; determines the propriety of the pro-
posed rate formulae; checks mathematical computations; analyzes, compares,
and evaluates judgment, trend, and projection factors; analyzes relevant
loss experience and expense factors; verifies the accuracy and appropriate-
ness of data in the filing by comparison with the insurer's annual state-
ment, expense exhibits, and reports of statistical agencies; evaluates the
statements of bureaus affected by deviations 1 and the waivers of their
right to hearings; if necessary, obtains additional information from the
filer; and, finally, notifies the filer of the final disposition of the matter.2
How all the steps are followed is difficult to understand,93 especially since
a filing may be 50 or more pages long and may contain hundreds of com-
putations, with literally thousands of bits of information?' Certainly this
work leaves little time for anything elsef 5
In 1967 the department "disapproved" 28 rate filings, less than two percent of the total
number filed. This small number may be deceptive since prior to making a formal filing in-
surers or bureaus often informally present proposals to the department and learn that they are
unacceptable. Moreover, disapproval may be avoided by modifications being made at the depart-
ment's suggestion. Information concerning why filings are disapproved is not available. The
department says that "disapprovals" occur because the rates proposed would be excessive, inade-
quate, or unfairly discriminatory and that this is what the filer is told. Response to question-
naire of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, supra note 55.
Unless the department has modified its definition of a filing or has changed its tabulation
techniques, the number of filings has dropped by one-third in a decade. During 1956 the depart-
ment handled more than 12,000 filings. OHIO DIRECTOR OF INSURANCE, 90TH ANNUAL RE-
PORT viii (1957).
91 The Ohio department received over 800 deviation filings in 1967. Response to question-
naire of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, supra note 55. For a discussion of deviation
filings see note 40 supra.
92 Response to questionnaire distributed by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission; OHIO
INSURANCE DEPARTMINT; BULLETIN No. 16 (Jan. 17, 1958).
93 The time required to process rate filings is suggested in Franson, supra note 89, at 1119-
21; R. Franson & G. Hartman, supra note 90, at 10-13. No such data is available for Ohio.
Apparently, work load and production information is not maintained.
94 See, e.g., filing of State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, dated May 15, 1967, involving
certain forms of automobile insurance for Ohio.
957Te attention focused on minutiae in regulating property and casualty rates is not unique
to Ohio. The New York Insurance Department has admittted:
Left alone with each other, the regulator and his industry unconsciously find a mu-
tual interest in ritualizing their relationship. The regulator must emphasize law and
regularity, against the day he is challenged in court or denounced in public. He thus
must look to form and detail, and may look away from the operating realities of the
industry and from the expectations of the public. The industry relies on the rituals of
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The rating section needs to extricate itself from the quagmire of detail
in which it is immersed. To routinely and unselectively review and analyze
masses of technical data is, as one commentator has said, "like enforcing
traffic regulations by placing a police officer at each and every intersection
and stop sign.""u  The existing pattern of regulation forces the depart-
ment to divert manpower that might otherwise effectively monitor the
actual operation of the property and casualty industry. Although nothing
in the Ohio statutes requires detailed review of each rate filing, the practice
has become so established in the Ohio Department of Insurance that prob-
ably the only way to discontinue it is to eliminate the filing requirement.
Under a no-file system-a type of system which in recent years has
gained a number of supporters97-- insurers and rate bureaus may devise
rates and put them into effect immediately. However, they must maintain
records concerning their rates, underwriting rules, and experience or other
information employed in making rates. The thrust of regulation under the
no-file system is on examinations of insurer and bureau rate-making pro-
cedures and on the application of rates to insureds."' The examinations
are conducted at insurer or bureau offices, supplemented by special investi-
gations of complaints and inquiries directed to the insurance department. 9
There are other potential advantages of a no-file system that give
weight to the idea of Ohio's adopting it. A no-file system may eliminate
procedural deterrents and delays in implementing rate changes, thereby
promoting competition and at the same time discouraging insurers from
regulation to make government behavior predictable and to keep the regulator occu-
pied where interference can be tolerated....
.... For the competent regulator the snare is not error, it is irrelevance.
N.Y. INs. DEP'T, THE PUBLIC INEREST NOW IN PROPERTY AND LIALITY INSuRANCE
REGULATION 11-12 (1969).
0 6 F ranson, supra note 89, at 1124.
97 Insurers operating in Ohio have warmly endorsed the no-file system. See Williams, In-
surer Views on Property and Liability Insurance Rate Regulation, 36 J. RISK & INS. 217, 228
(1969). In 1961 the United States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
reported that the no-file statutes "appear to be best designed to bring insurance rate regulation
into conformity with the competitive requirements of the antitrust laws." S. REP. No. 831, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1961). After an extensive analysis of California's no-file system, the New
York Insurance Department concluded: "Although there is no rating system which will be a pan-
acea for all property and liability problems, a more competitively oriented no-filing law would
appear to offer the most promising and constructive approach. It has worked in California for
twenty years, and is working well in other states which have adopted it recently ...." N.Y. INS,
DEP'T, supra note 95, at 144 (1969). The no-file system is in effect in about six states. Id.
at 78.
9 8 Roddis, Why a Competitive Rate Law?, J. INs. INFo., March-April 1969, at 7, 9. See
also 1969 PROCEED NGS, NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF INsURANcE CosSSIONmlS 356-57.
99 For example, California has a no-file system and virtually all 20 members of its rate regu-
latory staff work in the field. Roddis, supra note 98, at 7, 9.
CODE § 3901.07 authorizes the insurance department to "make an examination of the af-
fairs of any insurance company doing business in this state as often as it deems expedient for
the protection of the interests of the people of this state.. Although the department has
confined itself to determining the financial condition of insurers pursuant to this statute, it may
empower the department to undertake rate examinations.
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using uniform rate-making practices; it permits the prompt upward ad-
justment of rates when needed without politically motivated interference
of the insurance department; and, through the field examination proce-
dure, it permits detailed review of actual practices, making it possible to
detect problems-such as unfair discrimination-that might otherwise go
unobserved. 100
Another deficiency of the Ohio Department of Insurance concerns the
paucity of administrative guidelines for rate regulation. The rate rules
that the department has promulgated relate primarily to mechanical require-
ments.'" 1  At present, materials are unavailable to assist anyone wanting
to understand departmental practices and policies for rate matters. The
lack of guidelines creates waste and delay in the regulatory process and
virtually eliminates the opportunity for public attention to focus on the
department's processes. Informality, which attends the bulk of adminis-
trative adjudication in most agencies, precludes adverse publicity by allow-
ing considerable latitude for compromise. 10 2  However, because of the lack
of departmental rules, formal orders, or opinions resulting from hearings
or judicial decisions, there has been inordinate reliance on informal, unre-
viewable action. With each matter handled on an ad hoc basis, regulation
becomes uneven; confidence in the contours of departmental practices and
policies is undermined; and statutory rate -provisions become irrelevant.
Certainly, more directives setting forth department policy are needed, as
are a willingness to conduct hearings' and to issue written opinions that
provide meaningful precedents.
10 0 See N.Y. INS. DEP'T, supra note 95, at 112-28; address by Kai-Kee, Twenty Years'
Experience under California's Rating Law, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT INSUR-
miS, Nov. 17, 1966.
10 1 See OIO INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, BULLETIN Nos. 16, 26, 28, 34-01, 45.
102 One commentator has estimated that ninety percent of a regulatory agency's power is ex-
ercised by methods other than formal adjudication or rule making. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 233 (1958). For Ohio insurance rate regulation activities, the figure is almost one
hundred percent.
Certainly differences of opinion between regulators and the regulated should be resolved,
whenever possible, through conference and negotiation rather than by formal hearings and liti-
gation. Formal hearings and litigaton are not only slow but expensive as well. Furthermore,
the adversary process with its rules of procedure and evidence may circumscribe a practical
determination of the merits of a particular rate matter. Nevertheless, it is naive to believe that
all issues are resolvable by informal conference and negotiation. Indeed, one should expect some
differences of opinion to be resolved by formal proceedings if the state is afirmatively facing its
responsibilities. Litigation and formal hearings in other states concerning rate matters suggest
there are real differences of opinion concerning interpretation of the laws.
103 In over twenty years the department has conducted only seven hearings. Three-of
which the department has no record-were held between 1953 and 1957. S. REP. No. 831, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). One, in 1958, involved a deviation filing of the Insurance Company
of North America. OHIo DIRECTOR OF INSURANCE, 92d ANNUAL REPORT vii (1958). An-
other, in February 1967, involved the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters. See note 106
infra. Two, in June and October 1968, involved a filing by the Transportation Insurance Com-
pany. Response to questionnaire of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, supra note 55.
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IV. PROCEDURES GOVERNING RIGHTS OF INSUREDS
A. Legislative Provisions
Although the Ohio Revised Code has not neglected the insured entirely,
the adequacy of the applicable sections is questionable, especially in light of
the department's limited activity in rate regulation. Sections 3935.09 and
3937.08 of the Code require every rate bureau or insurer that makes
its own rates to furnish upon the request of "any insured affected by a
rate made by it . . . all pertinent information as to such rate" and to
provide "reasonable means by which any person aggrieved by the applica-
tion of its rating system may be heard "concerning" the manner in which
such rating system has been applied in connection with the insurance af-
forded him." To obtain the information, the insured making the request
must first pay "such reasonable charge" as the bureau or insurer may deter-
mine.104 Should the insured request a hearing about the application of
the rating system, the hearing is conducted by the partisan bureau or in-
surer. Furthermore, the statutes do not seem to authorize an appeal
from the hearing, although they do permit an appeal to the director of
insurance if the insured's request for information or a hearing is denied.
Moreover, the statutes are silent about remedies of the insured "aggrieved
by the application of its [the bureau's or insurer's) rating system."' 05
Other sections which would seem to afford redress to the "aggrieved"
insured are likewise limited. Under sections 3935.05(D) and 3937.04(B)
of the Ohio Revised Code any person or organization, other than the in-
surer or rate bureau that made the filing, "aggrieved with respect to any
filing which is in effect" may request the director of insurance to conduct
a hearing. The director must proceed if he finds (1) that the request is
made in good faith, (2) that the applicant would be aggrieved if his
grounds are established, and (3) that the alleged grounds otherwise justify
a hearing. After the hearing the director may withdraw the filing if he
finds that it does not comply with all relevant statutory provisions. How-
ever, since the withdrawal operates only prospectively, relief is of limited
value. By the time the director conducts a hearing and renders his opinion
(and perhaps a court considers an appeal), the matter may be moot, since
a new filing may be in effect.'06 This would be the usual result in most
104The provisions seem to deal only with misclassifications of insureds. CODE sections
3935.05(D) and 3937.04(B) speak in terms of failure of a filing to comply with the entire appli-
cable chapter, whereas sections 3935.09 and 3937.08 speak only of the way a rating system is ap-
plied to the individual insured.
105 CODE §§ 3935.09, 3937.08.
100In Ohio AFL-CIO v. National Bureau of Casaalty Underwriters, No. 9196 (Ct. App.
Franklin Co. Aug. 2, 1969), appea dismissed, 43 Ohio Bar 130 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 28, 1970), the
rates reviewed were filed in November 1966. The director of insurance conducted a hearing
in February 1967 and issued an opinion in May 1967. In April 1968 the Common Pleas Court
of Franklin County, Ohio, affirmed the decision of the director. The Franklin County Court
of Appeals dismissed an appeal in August 1969, on the ground that the "rates objected to by ap-
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rate challenges, because rate filings are generally made every year, espe-
cially for casualty insurance.
There may be an additional limitation to sections 3935.05(D) and
3937.04(B) of the Ohio Revised Code. According to a recent opinion of
the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio,10 7 policyholders
may not have a court review the director's decision on a challenged casu-
alty rate filing. The court ruled that Chapter 3937 of the Code
makes no provision for policyholder appeals. It determined that be-
cause section 3937.15108 expressly permits appeals by any "insurer or rating
organization aggrieved" by the director's order or decision, insureds
cannot bring appeals under this section. The court also held that policy-
holders may not appeal rate matters under the Ohio Administrative Pro-
cedure Act 09 because, in acting upon rate filings, the director "has no
authority in law to adjudicate such filings," his authority being "limited
solely to determining compliance with Chapter 3937."
Although the reasoning of the court is unclear and its conclusions as-
sailable, the decision presents a roadblock to insureds wanting to challenge
rate filings in the courts, especially since the decision is the only one in
Ohio interpreting the insurance rate regulatory provisions. The decision
leaves open the question whether insureds are within the category of
"aggrieved persons" when the term is otherwise undefined in the various
sections of Chapters 3935 and 3937 of the Ohio Revised Code.110 Sections
3935.05 and 3937.04 (authorizing any aggrieved "person or organization"
to request a hearing) do not specify whether insureds are aggrieved per-
sons, although sections 3935.09 and 3937.08 (allowing "insureds" to ap-
peal to the director when an insurer or rating organization fails to supply
requested information) refer expressly to insureds. Arguably, an insured
pellants have been supplanted by new rate filings" and "no judgment could be rendered to 'roll
the rates back' or to collect back, on behalf of any insured, any premium so paid while such pro-
tested rates were in effect." Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the case should be dis-
missed for being moot These opinions are the only ones by Ohio courts concerning chapters
3935 and 3937 of the CODE.
107 Ohio AFL-CIO v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, No. 230,476 (C.P. Frank-
lin Co., April 3, 1968).
108 Since the issue involved a casualty rate filing, the court focused only on chapter 3937.
The appeals provision in chapter 3935, section 3935.14, is considerably more detailed than sec-
tion 3937.15, but similar to section 3937.15; it authorizes appeals by "any insurer, advisory
organization, or rating bureau" aggrieved by the director's order.
109 CODE § 119.12. See also CODE § 3901.041.
110 See Insurance Dep't v. Philadelphia, 196 Pa. Super. 221, 233 n.3, 173 A.2d 811, 817, n.3,
(1961). McCullough, Insurance Rates in the Courts: Part I, 1961 INs. L.J. 381, 391-92. "There
is considerable difference of opinion among state... officials as to who would be considered an
aggreived party under the provisions of their laws." 1960 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL AssocI-
ATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 107. Cf. Comment, 58 MicIL L. REV. 730, 731 n.6,
737-53 (1960).
In a hearing on a casualty rate filing of the Transportation Insurance Company on October
21, 1968, the department allowed the Ohio Association of Independent Agents to challenge the
filing as an aggrieved party under CODE section 3937.04(B). Contra, Virginia Ass'n of Ins.
Agents v. Virginia, 201 Va. 249, 110 S.E.2d 223 (1959).
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cannot be an aggrieved person under sections 3935.05 and 3937.04, since
insureds have remedies only under those sections which expressly provide
for them.
B. Consumer Oriented Reforms
With insured choices limited to cancelling coverage with one insurer
and placing his business with another, to complaining to an insurance
department which is generally sympathetic with the industry in rate-mat-
ters, and to requesting a hearing before the insurer or bureau, the property
and casualty enterprise is virtually insulated from policyholders. Yet,
little attention has been given to insureds' need for a voice in rate making or
rate regulation. Arguably, the state insurance department represents cus-
tomer interests, but this viewpoint may be more an expression of the Jack-
sonian philosophy of democracy than of actual practice.
This is the era of "consumerism""'-a label which describes such aims
as fostering public awareness of and sophistication about available prod-
ucts and services, providing direct, effective means of remedying consumer
injustices, and of allowing buyers to express their views to both producers
and regulators with confidence that such views will be thoughtfully consid-
ered and, if legitimate, acted upon. At present, the insurance consumer is
virtually impotent. Not only is he ignorant of the rate-making and rate
regulatory processes, but also, he has no effective way of expressing his
views or of obtaining relief. Until consumer interests are given greater
recognition, they will stand as the most neglected of the several goals of
rate regulation.
In addition to amending the existing provisions to remove the restric-
tions just discussed, there are other ways of allowing consumers a greater
voice in property and casualty insurance rate-making and rate regulation.
These range from an insurance department advisory committee to legisla-
tion permitting class actions.
The basic function of an advisory committee is to provide a vehicle
by which diverse interests and opinions may be heard. It permits a dia-
logue which not only may result in tapping the expertise and opinions of
interested persons, but may also lead to a better appreciation of particular
problems and viewpoints so that legitimate interests will not be violated.
Over a dozen advisory committees have been appointed pursuant to the
111 See Whitford, The Age of Consumerism, BEST'S RV E , June 1969, at 38 (property-
liability ed.); BusiNEss WEEK Sept. 6, 1959, at 94.
Some individuals look upon "consumerism" as meaning a chauvinist attitude toward the
public by politicians. In C. KULP & J. HALL, CASUALTY INstRANcE 422 (4th ed. 1968),
the authors remark: "Finally, politically motivated persons, taking a page from the private en-
terprise book of philosophy, have learned that consumer issues are supreme in their vote-getting
potential. ... [I]t must be expected that every fault will tend to be exaggerated far beyond its
rational proportions."
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Ohio Revised Code,1 2 a few of which have "public" representatives.'"
Several drawbacks of advisory boards, however, are substantial and may
militate against their creation in the insurance area. If an advisory com-
mittee's size is to remain reasonable, representation of different viewpoints
is difficult, if not impossible. Selection of "public" representatives can
readily develop into a system for rewarding party faithfuls. Absent ade-
quate budget and staff support, which the legislature has been unwilling
to authorize for such groups, the committee becomes little more than a
discussion body whose influence is negligible. Finally, many persons out-
side the insurance industry are not organized with spokesmen to represent
their interests. This may cause the consultive process to operate unfairly
since not all viewpoints will be effectively presented."
Another means of achieving greater public representation in insurance
rate regulation is the appointment of a "people's counsel." Arguably, this
counsel could represent the interests of all consumers in insurance rate reg-
ulatory matters, providing a force to counterbalance the property and ca-
sualty industry." 5  The concept of a "people's counsel" presupposes that
all consumers have a unified interest which may be presented by one
advocate or a limited number of diverse interests which may be presented
by several advocates. To the contrary, property and casualty insurance
consumers are highly heterogeneous. With rates being determined on the
basis of classification of insureds, their interests in rate regulation are
disparate and fractionalizedL" 6 Although a people's advocate may be ef-
fective in such areas as consumer frauds (where the public's interest tends
to be monolithic), for insurance rate regulation the idea seems impracti-
cable.
Before an insured, or group of insureds, can assert a claim there must
be an awareness that one exists. Most individuals know littie about the
property and casualty insurance enterprise. Indeed, many persons are un-
doubtedly intimidated by the complexity of the product and hesitate to
expose their ignorance in trying to obtain information about rates, cover-
ages, and services of companies. Neither the insurance department nor in-
11 Section 121.13 authorizes departmental directors, with approval of the governor, to ap-
point advisory groups to aid them in conducting their work. See also, e.g., CoDE §§ 1503.40,
3701.36.
113 These committees are listed in T. BROWN, OFFICIAL ROSTER OF FEDERAL, STATE AND
CoUNTY OFFIcERs AND DEPARTMENTAL fOhiol INFORMATION 360-98 (1969).
In 1961 a governor's advisory committee met twice to consider and suggest insurance leg-
islation. The committee was appointed in 1958. OHO DIRECTOR OF INSURANcE, 95th A N-
NUAL REPORT viii (1962).
114 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 366 (1958).
115 People's counsel has been appointed in insurance rate proceedings. For example, in
1968 policyholders were represented by a state-appointed public defender in a New Jersey hear-
ing on automobile liability rates. Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1968, at 34, col. 1 (midwest ed.).
116 See Insurance Dep't. v. Philadelphia, 196 Pa. Super. 221, 228 n.3, 173 A.2d 811, 817
n.3 (1961).
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surers provides the public with information about the types of insurers
offering coverage, the kinds and costs of available coverage, the rights of
policyholders under the rate regulatory statutes, or the activities and ser-
vices of the department. The information insureds do receive concerning
the property and casualty insurance industry is mainly in the form of
sales information or industry sponsored advertising, z7 advertising which,
as one observer has said, "can itself be seen as opposed to the public
interest.":1 " In short, the insurance industry should not, and cannot, be
relied upon to inform the public. How then should insureds become in-
formed?
One possibility is to have the insurance department conduct public hear-
ings on major bureau, deviation, and independent rate filings. Such hear-
ings would also present an opportunity for members of the public to ex-
press their views. The effectiveness of public hearings, however, is
hampered by several limitations. First, rate filings involve such highly
technical matters that the public may fail to become interested in the hear-
ings. Second, the department may not be receptive to insurer views be-
cause it may feel that any needed information may be obtained from the
bureau or insurer prior to the hearing. Third, public hearings may fail
to develop the department's position because generally it does not offer any
evidence during proceedings it conducts. Fourth, the department may
tend to emphasize prevention of rate increases in order to gain popular
support for itself and the incumbent political party." 9
In view of the limitations associated with public hearings, a more ef-
fective method of informing the public might be accomplished through a
department-sponsored consumer information program. While consumers
have always been the primary beneficiaries of the insurance department's
work in rate regulation, the department has nevertheless concentrated on
policing insurers rather than on educating consumers. At present, the three
means used by the Ohio Department of Insurance to educate consumers
are virtually worthless. One means is the publication of an annual list of
1
'
7 Reportedly the Ohio Insurance Institute, composed of a number of insurance companies,
spends approximately $200,000 a year for newspaper advertising. The advertising is aimed at
generating public support for the property and casualty insurance industry. See, e.g., the Insti-
tute's ad in the Columbus Dispatch (Ohio), April 29, 1969, at 6A, entitled, "What You Should
Know About Auto Insurance Profits;" and, "Sure... Auto Insurance Rates Are Up! But Be
Glad You Live in Ohio" in the Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Jan. 21, 1969, at 15.
128 Smith, The Miscegenetic Union of Liability Insurance and Tort Process in the Personal
niury Claims System, 54 CORMNLL L. REv. 645, 703 (1969).
In South Carolina the state insurance department sought court authority to restrain insurer
propaganda on public issues affecting the industry. Id. at 703 n.223.
Recently the Wisconsin Insurance Laws Revision Committee proposed that insurers be re-
quired to send to the insurance commissioner a copy of any communication distributed generally
to policyholders. This gives the commissioner an opportunity to order insurers to revise the
materials or inform policyholders of the facts himself. Pfennigstorf, Enforcement of Insur-
ance Laws, 1969 Wis. L. R!v. 1026, 1062.
119 Cf. Williams, Insurer Views on Property and Liability lsurance Rate Regulation, 36
J. RIsK & INS. 217, 230 (1969).
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companies licensed to write coverage in the state; 20 another is the publica-
tion of statistical data taken from the annual statements of insurers filed
with the department; 121 a third is acceptance and action on consumer com-
plaints filed with the department. 122  The information contained in the two
publications is of little practical use, and the complaint procedure--al-
though admittedly it may serve to educate consumers by way of feedback
concerning the handling and disposition of their inquiries-is limited by
the education process itself: A consumer must be aware of his right to
complain, know what he is complaining about, and be informed of where
to complain.' 23 Too few Ohio insureds are so sophisticated.
The Ohio Department of Insurance is capable of giving recognition to
the new status consumers want.124  It can do this through a well conceived
consumer information program. For example, the department could pre-
pare and disseminate materials to consumers describing the property and
casualty insurance industry, including differences among insurers, their
differences in coverage and rates offered, and the regulation of those rates
by the state. In conjunction with this program the department could pre-
pare a consumer newsletter,125 containing easily understandable summaries
of departmental activities and informing consumers of their rights. Initial
circulation of the newsletter could include the press, consumer organiza-
tions, and public and scholastic libraries. Going a step further, the depart-
ment could make itself more accessible to the public by opening branch
1 20 D!FECTOR OF INSURANCE, LIST OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AuTHoRIZED TO TRANS-
ACT BusINEss iN THE STATE OF OHIO.
121 DIRECTOR OF INSURANCE, ANNUAL REPoRT. In recent years this report has become
nothing more than a statistical repository consisting of over 200 pages of figures. Several years
ago annual reports described the organization of the insurance department, presented data show-
ing departmental activity, outlined recent insurance legislation, and described the Ohio insurance
industry, including the concentration of business. See, e.g., OHIO DIRECTOR OF INSURANE,
95th ANNUAL REPORT (1959).
Reports of the department are required pursuant to sections 149.01 and 3901.14. See also
CODE § 121.18. The department recently appears to interpret these provisions as only requir-
ing the tabulation of statistics it publishes in the annual report. Section 149.01 requires a more
elaborate report but not its publication. In the past, however, the department has published
the section 149.01 report. The information the department must report pursuant to section
149.01 includes a summary of departmental transactions and proceedings and departmental sug-
gestions and recommendations. Perhaps section 149.01 should be amended to require publica-
tion of reports made pursuant to the section.
122 The department receives about 3,000 consumer complaints or inquiries a year. Ohio
Leg. Serv. Comm., Complaints on Property Hazard Insurance Cancellations and Non-renewals,
Appendix II, Oct. 16, 196& (unpublished memorandum).
123 There is only one place to file complaints concerning insurance matters: the insurance
department's office in Columbus.
124 Cf. Jones, The Role of Administrative Agencies as Instruments of Social Reform, 19
AD. I. REV. 279, 293-94 (1967).
Recognition of consumer interests may result in a significant benefit. "[A] well-considered
and carefully designed publicity program can contribute considerably toward making policy-
holders more careful in their dealing with insurers, reducing complaints, and in general alleviat-
ing the commissioner's task of regulating the business." Pfennigstorf, supra note 118, at 1063.
125 Starting in the late 1950's and continuing until the late 1960's the department published
a newsletter periodically. The newsletter was directed toward the industry, not consumers.
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offices outside Columbus 28 or by providing toll-free telephone service from
anywhere in Ohio to the department's offices in Columbus. Increased
accessibility of the department would afford consumers a greater opportunity
to file complaints and to obtain information,'-' while providing a means
whereby the department may become more aware of the needs and con-
cerns of insureds.
Another way of advancing the interests of insureds is through class ac-
tions128  Class actions coupled with rate roll backs, refunds, and recovery
of expenses would be an effective way of assuring sufficient incentive for
policyholders to enforce their rights.' 29  How the class action may benefit
120 The Florida insurance department, for example, maintains 21 field offices, each in one
of the state's population centers. INSURANCE, June 21, 1969, at 56.
127 See NATIONAL ADvISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIOT-AFFECrED AREAS, IEET-
ING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIBS 108 (1968).
Consumer complaints could be made public, if proper safeguards were used. For example,
legislation could provide that complaints by insureds would be made public provided permis-
sion of the person filing the complaint is obtained and then only after the party complained about
has had 30 or 60 days in which to file an answer. Information about complaints of insureds
would enable consumers to make better choices.
The Consumer's Union recently reported policyholder reactions to the service of 25 casualty
insurers. Consumer's Union sought to determine which insurers are most likely to pay claims
promptly, courteously, and in full, which are least likely to cancel coverage, and which are least
likely to increase rates sharply. The technique employed was a survey of Consumer Reports
subscribers. 35 CONSUMER REPORTS 332 (1970). Consumer's Union has also reported on
which coverages to buy and how to make price comparisons. 35 CONSUMER REPORTS 426
(1970).
128 The possibility of class actions of insureds is a recent development. See generally Den-
enberg, New Remedy for the Defrauded Insured, TRIAL, Dec.-Jan. 1969-70 at 49. Contra,
Comment, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 625.22 (West Supp. 1970) (discussing the theory that the in-
surance department's job is to protect the public). For an exhaustive analysis of consumer class
actions see Starrs, The Consumer Class Action--Part I: Consid6rations of Equity, 49 BOST. L.
REV. 211 (1969); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49
PoST. L REv. 407 (1969).
Class actions in Ohio have been bolstered by new Rules of Civil Procedure, effective July 1,
1970. Ohio Rule 23 is virtually identicial to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 with Ohio R. Civ. P. 23. Cf. Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for
Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L REV. 497 (1969). Pursuant to Ohio Rule
24(B) the insurance department or its director has a conditional right to intervene "when a
party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute ... administered by a
... state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order,.., issued or made pur-
suant to the statute .. "
12 9 Rate roll backs and refunds occur in the public utility area. See, e.g., Illinois Bell
Telephone Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1939), where more than one million subscriber-
claimants received about $17 million, with about 85 percent of the claims being under $25 each.
Rate refunds for property and casualty insurance have been endorsed recently in New York
and Wisconsin. N.Y. INS. LAW § 179 2.a. (McKinney Supp. 1970); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
625.22(4) (West Supp. 1970).
Incentives for insureds to sue insurers for proscribed rate-making activities were in existence
in the early 1900's. For example, an Alabama statute allowed insureds to recover a twenty five
percent penalty, in addition to the actual damage suffered, if the insurer was connected with a
rate bureau. The statute was upheld as a valid exercise of the state's police power in German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307 (1911).
In a number of jurisdictions legislation allows the award of attorney fees to private litigants
who enforce rights arising out of a regulatory controversy. Stoeback, Counsel Fees Included in
Costs: A Logical Development, 38 COLO. L. REV. 202, 209-10 (1966). The allowance of such
fees is not novel, especially when a fund is generated for the benefit of a number of persons.
Id. at 207. Cf. CODE § 309.13 permitting the allowance of costs, including attorney fees, in
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the insured and at the same time enhance the regulatory scheme may be il-
lustrated when a claim of excessive rates exists. Since such a claim for an
individual insured generally involves a small sun of money, complex facts
and intricate law, the expense of pursuing it greatly exceeds the potential
recovery. Thus, there is little incentive to enforce rate regulatory stan-
dards. If a class action could be maintained, recovery in the ag-
gregate would be substantial and incentive to question rates greatly
enhanced. Class actions have two other advantages. First, representative
claims capture public attention more readily than do private ones, and
as public attention focuses on insurance rate regulation, insureds who have
been ignorant of their rights or hesitant to enforce them may decide to
act. Additionally, to avoid accusations of inactivity which would arise if
there were a rash of policyholder suits, the Ohio Department of Insurance
may become more vigorous in carrying out its responsibilities. Insurers
may assert that this proposal will subject them to harassment from droves
of policyholders encouraged in their efforts by selfish lawyers and others
seeking to generate fees. The argument overlooks the fact that the basic
purpose of rate regulation is to protect the public. If the rate regulatory
standards are violated certainly the public should not be precluded from
seeking redress; spurious claims can always be dismissed by the department
or the courts without undue expenditure of resources.
V. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, "lethargy" probably best characterizes the regulation
of property and casualty rates in Ohio. The statutes fail to provide the
foundation for vigorous regulation, and the insurance department appears
almost uninterested in administering existing provisions of the Ohio Re-
vised Code. Reforms are needed, including especially stricter surveillance
of rate bureaus and advisory organizations, statutory definitions of "ex-
cessive" and "inadequate," and effective remedies for insureds. Without
such reforms rate regulation in Ohio will continue to be as weak as it has
been since the existing system was established over twenty years ago.
taxpayer's suits. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0127 permits the award of attorney fees by courts
upon a judgment or decree against an insurer in favor of an insured.
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